This is not true in that the consciousness correlates with a certain minimal amount of cortical activity and brainstem activation. Without these there is no consciousness – they correlate 100%. What you really mean is that we do not know exactly how this brain function produces what we experience as our own consciousness. Not knowing how \does not call into question the more basic fact that the brain causes consciousness.

The brain causing consciousness is not in question. It is mind/brain identity that dualists dispute. So we can say something nebulous like “we can turn this off and the lights go dark”, but that isn’t really saying much. Heck, you can destroy the entire brain and consciousness is lost, but we certainly wouldn’t accept this as a valid proof of physicalism. But none of this comes close to filling the gap that the Hard Problem creates; this is why we still have dualists.

I am aware that there are different kinds of dualism – and mine is not a philosophy blog so I did not intend to delve into the various philosophical distinctions. It is true that emergent and property dualism allow for the fact that the brain causes mind, but hold that the mind is something more than the brain that causes it.

If you make philosophical claims you should attempt to be philosophically sound. Yes, dualists believe that mind is something above and beyond the brain, but then you cite correlation between mind functions and brain events as some kind of evidence against dualism, as if they do not believe the two are related.

While I did not address this specifically, my criticism still applies. If one argues that the brain is insufficient to explain the mind, and uses as a basis for that claim the fact that we do not understand how the brain causes mind, then that, in my opinion, is the very logical fallacy I was pointing out. With regard to emergent dualism my position is that it is simply unnecessary – it makes no predictions that would allow it to be distinguished from strict materialism.

It is not because there is missing evidence or something like that. It is because there is a conceptual gap that just won’t be crossed by throwing more physical facts at. That is almost the very definition of qualia. And even though the scientific predictions of emergent dualism and materialism may not very, emergent dualists would make the claim that the explanatory power of ED encompasses things which we would all accept and materialism is as of yet helpless to handle. We seem to possess novel causal powers. How is that possible from a materialist view? Rocks are not rational, but we are. Obviously we have something now that rocks have never had, and since we all come from the same stuff we are looking at something that looks very much like emergence.

While you unfairly challenge my skepticism, you have not supported any challenge to my position. Which one of my neuroscience premises is false? What logical fallacy have I committed?

Neuroscience, as far as I know, has no premises. Materialism has several, however. Take for example the Causal Closure Thesis: Any event at time t has a physical cause at t.
If that is true, then we simply are stuck with naturally occurring phenomena that are inexplicable. Why reason? Why consciousness? A zombie could stand in for us and natural selection would be none the wiser.
In effect, you are not committing a logical fallacy per se, in that I cannot find any formal flaws in your nonexisting syllogism. However, informally it is simply misrepresenting the dualists; they DO believe in mind/brain correlation, just not mind/brain identity.

You state the common dualist premise that the mind does not display any physical properties – but this is a non sequitur. This in no way requires that mind as a phenomenon cannot be entirely created by the physical functioning of the brain (qualia not withstanding).

No, the mind does display properties that are physical properties, it just appears that there are some properties that are non-physical. Whatever experience is, that seems to be one of them.